Introduction
An increasing amount of organizations is using auctions to procure large amounts of goods and services. The European Union, for instance, estimated that, within the EU, governments and EU agencies alone procured for e1500 billion worth in goods and services, or 16% of EU GDP in 2002 1 . This is no coincidence since EU rules specify that any procurement above certain thresholds has to be done trough some type of tender 2 . Although similar developments, regulations and the problems connected to them exists in all over the world, ultimate goal of these directives is to achieve a transparent, non-discriminatory competition procedure, by giving all interested parties the possibility to submit an o¤er, and by judging the o¤ers on transparent and objective criteria.
From time to time these tenders led to disputes, some of which ended in legal procedures between the procuring government agency and one of the interested parties. The subsequent court rulings show a legalistic view on the procurement procedures; both the legislation covering the procedures and the requests for quotes are to be read by the letter and taken as literally as possible to ensure equal procedures in all member states. 3 This interpretation of the rules leaves government bodies in a peculiar state; they have to adhere to strict procedural rules and requirements, while acquiring goods and services in very diverse and often complex settings. 3 In one particularly sad case the government agency complained that the contract was incompletely full…lled, since no communication devices were installed on the new sewer pumps, while the contract stipulated that the pumps should be able to communicate. The contractor replied by claiming that the pumps were technically capable of communication, but the contract did not stipulate that they actually communicate.
The contractor won.
A problem acquiring agencies encounter is that quantities are not known or can not be speci…ed ex ante. For instance, in a road service contract no-one can tell how many holes will be repaired next year, so it is impossible to tell how much work will be granted. It is therefore common practice to negotiate unit-price-contracts and calculate the …nal bill based on those prices. This way contracts can still be signed ex ante. To compare the o¤ers made for these contracts the acquiring agency requests unit prices from possible suppliers for all products and services that can fall under the contract. These lists of prices are then compared by creating a score rule and selecting the o¤er with the lowest score. Returning to the road-maintenance example, the list of prices would specify the price for anything from moving the asphalt machine, to the price of a square meter of asphalt, to the costs of replacing side-curbs and road markings. In these cases the score rule is usually known as a …ctional work because it simulates a large scale project, including an amount of machine movements, top-layers to be removed and replaced etc. The total cost of this …ctional work is calculated for each bidder and the cheapest contractor for the …ctional work (lowest score)
wins the auction.
At the end of the contract year the …nal bill is determined by multiplying tendered unitprices with the work done, ignoring the …ctional work used for selection. The di¤erences between the quantities in the …ctional work and the actual quantities give rise to some unwanted e¤ects and remarkable price quotes. In a tender process that was brought to my attention, one bidder quoted a one time e200,000 rebate on the total contract, while requiring a mark-up of 100 times the estimated market price for one of the items in the price list. 4 The random nature of the quantities in the contract will always lead to some price uncertainty on the …nal bill, but this uncertainty is increased dramatically by such extreme per-unit prices.
This extra risk is socially undesirable, even more so for a budget driven organization. In practice there is also the problem that contractors seem to be able to …nd the misestimates in the score rule better than the government-employees, allowing them to drive up the …nal bill. This was clearly illustrated in the tender process mentioned above. When the quantities of the …ctional work were replaced by the realized quantities from the year before, it became clear that the winning bid would have been the most expensive contractor the year before.
Although this outcome might have been extreme, this type of bidding behavior is fairly common for unit price auctions and is known as skewed or unbalanced bidding. In this paper I add to the literature by proposing two relatively simple remedies to bid skewing that remove the incentive to skew ex ante, an approach that has not been done before. By either hiding the score rule or by awarding the contract to several winners and adding posttender competition the incentive to skew the bids is removed. For the acquiring agency this implies that the procedure can be made to lead to the desired outcomes: fair and non-skewed prices from a market-wide competition in a nondiscriminatory and transparent procedure.
Furthermore, I relate these adjustments to the prevailing legal environment.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the problem through the economic theory and continues by discussing some solutions found in practice or in the literature. Section 3 goes in to detail by describing both the problem and my solutions in terms of a model and is followed by a simpli…ed example and some concluding remarks.
Most of the mathematical results are derived in the appendix.
Related literature
The theoretical discussion of unbalanced bidding can be split into two strands of literature according to whether they study the problem from the side of the bidders or the side of the bid-takers. The fact that prices in a unit price or scale auction could be set strategically to increase revenue was noticed …rst in the sector of operations research and construction management. A seminal paper in this aspect is Stark (1974) In this paper Stark shows that one can turn the process of determining the individual prices into a linear programming problem and than solve it. In his paper he takes account of a large amount of problems and possible objectives of the bidders, including practical issues as cash ‡ow requirements etc.
Following Stark quite some papers have been published in the operational research and construction management literature focussing on the issue of how to place the optimal bid, an interesting overview of this literature is given in Cattel et all. (2007).
The theory and empirics of unbalanced bidding from the bidtakers point of view
Fairly recently a strand of literature, including this paper, has emerged that focuses on the e¤ects of this strategic bidding behavior for the bid-taker. From the bid-takers perspective, the problem of unbalanced bidding can be placed in the larger problem of how to design a multidimensional auction. In this paper, however, I do not propose an optimal mechanism and will abstract from quality considerations. I concede that this potentially limits the scope of application, but think that this is a necessary simpli…cation. Furthermore bidders appear to use private information. The winning bidder is often the one that skews most, although it is not signi…cantly di¤erent in skewness from the runner-up.
The average payment per 1000 board feet of timber falls about 3% short of the payment that was expected from the score of the winning bid. This does not directly translate to revenue loss however, since skewing allows bidders to bid more competitively. Although an increase in the misestimation is correlated with an increase in the skewness of the bids, there is also evidence that the informational rent is competed away, only a non-signi…cant increase in revenue remains for the winning bidder as a result of increased misestimation on the margin.
A further theoretical contribution was by Ewerhart & Fieseler (2003, henceforth E&F) .
They use a reverse auction setting in which a project has to be completed using a …xed amount of material and an amount of labor that depends on the e¢ ciency of the contractor selected. The procurer knows the amount of material needed but only has an estimation of the amount of labor needed. First the procurer posts a price request toward interested contractors. The contractors bid through a unit price for labor and material. These unit prices are then multiplied with their relative weights in the estimate of the acquirer and added to create the …nal bid. The bidder with the lowest bid is selected. E&F show that, the bidfunctions (of the …nal bids) are non-monotonic in the e¢ ciency parameter. Furthermore they show that the acquirer underestimates the payment required, i.e. the true payment is higher than the winning aggregated bid. They go on to show that the acquirer can use the score-rule to intensify competition in such a way that it more than compensates for possible e¢ ciency losses or information rents, which will be discussed in more detail in the solutions subsection below. are also quite easily classi…ed as skewed bidding. In this auction the di¤erence between the estimates of Google and the bidders were not only caused by di¤erences in information, but also because the bidders could actively increase or decrease the prevalence of certain actions.
A bidder could, for instance, set a high fee for every time a certain link is clicked and then hide or remove the link so that link is always overweighed by Google. By alternating links to be overweighted and underweighted, the system was quite easily played. These issues caused
Google to return to the Pay Per Click auction they used before.
solutions in theory and practice
Both in the literature and in practice attempts have been made to solve the problem of skewed bidding, but most of these are based on dealing with the skewed bid ex post, instead of stopping them ex ante. One could argue that the multi-round or hybrid (optimal) mechanism prescribed for the multi-attribute procurement in papers like Che (1993) could be adapted, but this fundamentally changes the mechanism. In this paper I like to add to the literature by suggesting ways to make skewing unpro…table ex ante, without changing the fundamental mechanism of the unit price auction.
The problem of bid skewing has evidently been recognized in both the US and Europe, since the rules governing public procurement allow government agencies to reject "materially unbalanced" (US) or "abnormally low" (EU) bids 5 . Although this regulation might allow agencies to reject unbalanced bids, it is does not stop unbalancing. It is only possible to reject an o¤er once it has been made, implying that these rules are not meant to end skewing, just to deal with it ex post. Furthermore, the rationale for picking the lowest price is to minimize cost, so rejecting the winning bid is, on the face of it, counterproductive. There might be some positive incentive working through these rules, however, since bidding just to get rejected can not be an equilibrium strategy. Unfortunately, for the EU at least this incentive is severely limited through the legal di¢ culties of de…ning abnormally low bid. Another solution used by many government agencies is to include in their standard terms a clause about severe misestimations. If an estimated quantity is overrun by a certain percentage (usually ranging between 10 and 25%) the unit price is renegotiated. This has the potential to limit the pro…ts of skewing, although the other party is always at the negotiation table with them.
Many government agencies have tried to reduce the problems by bringing more expertise into the acquiring agency and reducing the gap between the score rule and the expected quantities. This does seem to alleviate the problem, but does not necessarily solve the problem, since estimation always has some error. A unit price of 0.01 euro's for service on di¤erent locations was not enough to conclude that the tender was abnormally low. 7 I talked to the people in charge of these procedures in the city of Rotterdam about bid-skewing and
Returning to the papers mentioned before, A&L note that the Forestry Service can set reserve prices, requiring bidders to bid at least some minimum price for the major species.
This e¤ectively limits the room bidders have to skew. Unfortunately, this only works if the bid-taker has enough information on the market prices, because setting these limits too stringently they could scare away bidders, hindering competition. Minimum prices do not however decrease the incentive to skew. In fact it creates a situations in which types are not revealed in the bids since pooling on the reserve prices can and does occur both in theoretical equilibrium and in real outcomes.
Using a mechanism design approach E&F create an optimal score rule, which can also be seen as a solution. In short, the score rule is used to subsidize ine¢ cient producers, which leads to more competitive pressure on the e¢ cient bidders, and thus lower prices.
There are several objections to this solution. First, it requires the acquiring agency to have enough knowledge about the cost structure in the market, which it might not have. In E&F information is single dimensional, while it is very much multidimensional in real life. When an agency needs more than 500 unit-prices, …nding the right score rule for the job maybe very hard or impossible, even if the distribution of cost-types is known. Second, the authors already note that this procedure does not guarantee allocative e¢ ciency. In his e¤orts to increase competition the acquiring agency creates a positive probability that an ine¢ cient contractor wins. The size of this problem in a one shot game is debatable. In terms of ex ante expected cost, the increased competition more than compensates for the increased cost in case an ine¢ cient contractor wins. The third objection seems most severe, even if we disregard allocative e¢ ciency and assume that the government can determine the optimal score rule, how will the contractors respond in the medium to long run? The optimization in E&F is static, while many real life procurement situations are repeated over and over again, and thus require a dynamic approach. In the road maintenance example the argument can be made more concrete. Given that contractors are willing to skew to the extent they have shown in the past, what is stopping them from faking ine¢ ciency to pro…t from this subsidization of ine¢ ciency? In fact, if ine¢ ciency is indirectly rewarded by a chance to win, their reaction was illustrative. They had noticed that basing the score rule on past quantities decreased the amount of skewing, but did not make it disappear.
why not specialize, or invest in ine¢ cient production technology to optimally exploit this subsidy?
3 The model 3.1 current process, or the rules of the game
Assume there is one acquiring agency that holds a procurement auction for a contract and there are N 2 interested parties, or bidders. At the moment the auction is held the M quantities required to service the contract, summarized in vector q(vectors are in boldface), are uncertain. Both the agency and all bidders receive a private signal about the quantities, s i ;(through out the paper subscripts denote players and superscripts units or bundles of units, the subscript 0 will be used to denote the agency) that they use to determine their expectations. Furthermore, before bidders submit their bid the agency announces a score function used to rate the bids. This score function is fully described by the vector containing the weights attached to each of the M products needed in the contract. This score function can be based upon the private information of the agency about the quantities.
Subsequently all bidders submit a bid consisting of a vector p i containing M per-unit prices.
The agency then selects the winner by picking the lowest of the scores B i = p T i ; the winning …rm serves the contract, while the loosing …rms earn a reservation pro…t normalized to zero.
Since the winning bidder will serve the contract, and has no in ‡uence on q, pro…t maximization is equivalent to revenue maximization and bidders will be treated as revenue maximizers.
E&F and A&L show that, in respectively the Symmetric Independent Private Value and the Common Value setting, from the point of view of each bidder the bid can be split in to two relevant parts: his score B i that determines the chance he wins, and the vector p i that determines the per-unit prices if he wins. This implies that the optimal bid can be determined in two steps, …rst determine the optimal skew, that is the optimal structure of p i (given the signals and …nal bid), and then calculate the optimal score given this skew (and the signal). This is also the strategy that is prescribed by many of the authors in the The same process is at work both in the normal unit price auction and in the reverse auction of the unit price procurement procedure. For my purposes the relatively easy to tract SIPV auction therefore su¢ ces and I will treat both parts of the bidding process separately.
Given the bids, the …nal payments will depend on the realized quantities q. Since these quantities are not known ex ante, the bidders use their private signal b s i = E(qjs i ; ) to determine their bids.
Problem analysis
The expected revenue of the winner is p In the end, for the agency conducting the unit price auction, skewing has the possibility to lead to a higher …nal bill (due to an information rent) and always leads to larger ex ante price uncertainty, since the variance of the …nal bill increases quadratically in the amount of skewing. For the bidders the procedure has some informational rents, but they come at the cost of unproductive extra risk, which could be hard to bear for the smaller participants in the market.
Both the possible higher …nal bill and the uncertainty over the …nal bill are caused by the skewness of the bids. Bidders skew their bids for two reasons. First, it gives them a higher expected pro…t if they win. Second, it allows them to bid more aggressively and thus increases their chance of winning, which in theory means the winner always skews his bid (A&L). The pro…tability of skewing is caused by di¤erences between the relative quantities in the score rule , and the expected quantities b s i . The obvious solution to this problem is decreasing these di¤erences. To achieve this bidders should not posses any information advantage over the acquirer, while in the standard procedure the acquiring agency announces his score rule.
By using a score rule equal to or based on his estimate of the real quantities, the agency reveals his estimate. Which means bidders always have at least as much information as the acquirer to base their estimate on. So, although well estimated score rules may reduce the problem, to overcome the problem altogether a di¤erent solution should be sought.
Franchising the contract can be done, it however changes the nature of the contract quite considerably so falls outside of the scope of this paper.
secret score rule
Keeping the score rule secret can end skewing. Since bidders do not know how the skewness of their bids will a¤ect their chance of winning, they would have to guess at both the agency's estimate and the true state to determine their bid, which makes skewing extremely risky.
This possibility will even disappear if the acquiring agency bases the score rule on an unbiased signal of q, so is an unbiased estimator of q such as s 0 . In that case E( ) = E(q) and no expected overweighting exists.
Unfortunately, at least within the EU, a secret score rule is legally di¢ cult. Art. 55 (2) of Directive 2004/17/EC and art. 53(2) of Directive 2004/18/EC read, the "contracting authority shall specify,. . . , the relative weighting which it gives to each of the criteria chosen to determine the most economically advantageous tender" 8 . This does not seem to leave much room for secrecy, but the second paragraph of these articles might provide a loophole.
"Those weightings can be expressed by providing for a range with an appropriate maximum spread."
If the spread of this range is big enough to hide , the bidders will still have to guess at the way skewing their bid in ‡uences their chance of winning. By using a big enough spread, such that s
and using a mixed strategy in determining the ranges around di¤erent weights (i.e. " m 6 = " m and both are random) the agency can obscure his estimate to the point that E( ) = E(q). The mixed strategy also ensures that bidders cannot backwards engineer the agencies estimates from the score rule. I have found no instances in practice where the weights are presented in a spread, and case-law on the subject of transparency does not seem to provide much room. So it seems like a di¢ cult strategy to follow.
split award auction
Instead of o¤ering the entire contract to one winner, it is possible to simultaneously grant parts of the contract to two or more winners. In the EU this can be done trough a framework contract, which can be used to selected 3 or more suppliers simultaneously. This makes this procedure easy to implement, since it is essentially a version of an existing procedure.
Selecting several winners reduces the tender procedure to a pre-selection tool. The auction selects "preferred suppliers" and when a job occurs (a road deteriorates to the point that replacement is needed) the most economically advantageous of the preferred suppliers gets the job. Jobs are described by a vector q l specifying the quantities required for this sub-part of the larger contract, such that q = P L l=1 q l :
Splitting the contract leads to a kind of post-auction competition, which the bidders will have to take into account when preparing their o¤ers. The possibility of the bid-taker to single-sidedly allocate jobs allows him to punish bidders by assigning them the jobs that are I claim that this procedure solves the bid skewing problem in the sense that it can assign the contract to the most e¢ cient parties and bid skewing is eliminated, while retaining or reattaining the desired non-discriminant, transparent and open procedure that treats all party equally. I will start by showing the e¢ ciency result and then show that an equilibrium exists in which bidders do not skew. Then a simpli…ed example is given where uniqueness of equilibrium can easily be shown.
e¢ ciency of the procedure
Suppose the contract is split up in P parts, so there are P objects for sale and N > P > 1 bidders. Bidders are allowed to win at most one object. Valuations v i are independently and identically distributed over some interval and admit cumulative distribution function F ( ).
Bidder i assigns a value 1 v i to object 1 and 2 v i to object 2. All v i are private information, N; a p ; 8p 2 [1; 2; ::; P ] and F ( ) are common knowledge and identical across bidders, with P +1 = 0. Without loss of generality I assume p > p+1 , which means contract parts are ordered in size. The scaling through p implies that each bidder prefers the …rst object over the second. The simplest interpretation is to assume bidders prefer a bigger part to a smaller part, which is a natural conclusion if no skewing exists.
All bidders simultaneously submit a private bid b i . The acquiring agency ranks the bids in size and the bidder with the highest bid receives object 1 and pays 1 b i , the runner up gets object 2 and pays 2 b i etc. Note that payment also varies with the contract size, i.e. the payment is also scaled trough the series .
Proposition 1 In a procedure with several winners an equilibrium with an e¢ cient allocation still exists.
Allocative e¢ ciency requires the P objects to go to the P bidders with the highest valuations in order of their valuation. This requires bidders to follow a bidding strategy that is symmetric and monotonically increasing in v i so I will focus on those strategies (v i ) that posses these qualities and have an inverse function
Denoting with u[ ] a concave utility function that is the same for all bidders, and de…ning:
the game has an equilibrium in bidfunctions where all bidders use the following bidfunction (derivation in appendix)
This condition holds trivially if 1 = 1 and if p = p+1 , so the constraint is not very restrictive.
As long as the contract sizes are chosen reasonably and ordered in size as assumed the bid functions are increasing.
For risk neutral bidders the bid function can be determined exactly:
Which is monotonically increasing in v if p > p+1 (see appendix) which holds trivially if the contracts are ordered in size and is the same condition as before since under risk neutrality the …rst derivative to u is constant. This bid function strongly resembles the bidfunctions in the single object …rst price sealed bid auction, in fact using P = 1 and 1 = 1 yields the standard bid-function.
Balancing the bids
To see that skewing is unpro…table in this situation let the contract be split up into two parts, P = 2, such that every time a job occurs, the acquiring agency can select one of the two preferred suppliers, i and j. Each job can be described with a vector, q l , containing all quantities needed to complete the job. The price for each job is
Proposition 2 Conditional on the procedure being allocatively e¢ cient, the post-tender competition will make skewing unpro…table and thus end bid skewing.
After the preferred suppliers are selected, the agency assigns each job using a "minitender", he calculates P l i and P l j and selects the lowest one, given the prices o¤ered in the original tender. The expected skewing pro…t of a job to the bidder that gets this job is:
, which can be both positive and negative, depending on the skew of his fellow preferred supplier.
There are four possibilities after the auction for which interim expected skewing-pro…ts can be determined:
1. the preferred suppliers have both not skewed; 2. only one of them skewed, the other did not skew; 3. they have skewed in di¤erent directions; 4. they have skewed in the same directions.
Since there is no problem in case 1, I will not treat it in debt. Proposition 1 establishes allocative e¢ ciency of the procedure, so I will assume that the two preferred supplier, i and j, are the most e¢ cient parties, and thus z i t z j : ad 2. If only i skewed, and j bids z j it is quite easy to see that
< 0 as long as z i t z j . This is intuitive since prices for this job are on average below the zero skewing-pro…t prices of the next competitor. ad 3 If they skewed on di¤erent units altogether, they both get all the jobs they underpriced and thus have a negative skewing pro…t. To see this, realize that to keep their score
at a winning level they have to skew as much downward as upward (weighted through the score rule). Since they skewed in di¤erent directions, the acquiring agency can assign them all jobs they underpriced. The jobs they overpriced go to the other player (who might have underpriced those) at least partially. This means skewing decreases pro…t as long as those overpriced units they incidentally get, do not compensate for taking the full loss over the underpriced units. Therefore the expected value is negative as long as the score rule is close enough to the expected quantities and I will assume E( p 
, so that the one that skews most is most likely to get the jobs intensive in the products he underpriced,
The skewing-pro…t increases linearly in the amount of skewing, but
So the one with the smallest skew is most likely to get the job. In this case skewing-pro…ts can be positive but only for the one with the smallest skew.
By combining the last two situations one can conclude the expected skewing-pro…t is negative in situation 4 as well. To keep their score on a winning level, the (score rule weighted) average positive skew should be of similar size to the average downward skew within each bid. Then, as long as the score rule is close enough to the real outcomes, bidders either get a relatively big loss or a relatively small pro…t of skewing. So as long as the score rule is close enough to the expected quantities, the interim expected value of a skew is negative.
The ex ante expected skewing-pro…t, E( p
is a convex combination of the expected pro…t in the four possible situations. If a score rule is chosen that is close to the actual quantities, the interim expected skewing-pro…t is non positive in all situations and strictly negative in at least one, making skewing unpro…table in expected terms. Therefore, skewing should disappear if a score rule is used that is close enough to the real quantities.
Using a score rule that is equal to the expected values thus has a double purpose, it selects the sellers that are most e¢ cient and helps prevent skewing.
conclusion
Proposition 1 shows that in equilibrium the procedure is e¢ cient if the valuations are symmetric, private and independently distributed. Proposition 2 shows that in equilibrium the bidders will not want to skew given that the procedure is e¢ cient and the others bidders don't skew. If bidders don't skew, their valuation of the contract only depends on their type z i , which is private and can be assumed to be independent. So this procedure has an equilibrium in which bidders do not skew their bids and the allocation is e¢ cient.
4 Illustration of the split-award auction
balancing the bid, binomial case
To make the statements in the last section more tangible some simpli…cations are in order.
Assume again that a reverse auction has been used to select two preferred suppliers, P = 2, 
Then increasing the price of a with p while decreasing the price of b with the same amount creates expected skewing pro…t per job:
While their score is
So, if the contract is awarded in one piece, it is pro…table to skew if fs The split-award procedure is as before, the agency assigns the jobs to the preferred suppliers based on their price for that individual job.
Proposition 3
In the binomial case the unique equilibrium is a pure strategy equilibrium where no player skews
After winners are selected, nature can draw 4 types of jobs: jobs that only require a; jobs that only require b; jobs that require both a and b; and jobs that require no units of a or b.
In the last two cases the skew on units a and b has no in ‡uence on the price of the job and the skewing pro…t is 0 per de…nition, so these can be ignored.
Focussing on the …rst two situations it is clear that positively skewing in a, will lead to a problem if b is required and vice versa. The pure strategy equilibrium is therefore quite easily constructed, if bidder i does not skew, the best response of bidder j is not to skew as well. Without skewing the situation is essentially Bertrand competition, so the only thing one has to realize is that by increasing the price of a bidder j ensures he is more expensive in a and therefore never gets any of the pro…table jobs. However, if a job comes up requiring b he has the lowest price, gets the job and takes the loss, making skewing unpro…table.
No equilibrium in mixed strategies exists. A mixed equilibrium where player i skews a …xed and known amount with some probability does not exist. The best response of player j to such a strategy of i is to skew slightly less and get only the pro…table jobs, i's best response is then to undercut j's best response etc. Since there is no restriction on the biddingspace this logic also excludes strategies over a noncontinuous interval, which is like
Bertrand competition in skewness instead of in prices.
As in Bertrand competition it is theoretically possible to have a mixed strategy equilibrium where bidders skew with some distribution over some interval. To show that these strategies can not be equilibrium either, assume …rst that an equilibrium exists where both i and j skew over some appropriate interval [c; d]. Assume s a > s b so p 0 and de…ne F ( ) as the Cumulative Distribution Function of p. In that case we know that the expected pro…t of skewing for each single job of a winning bidder is the same on the entire interval:
rewriting, taking into account that e must be …xed in equilibrium, this leads to:
Since F ( ) is a CDF it should be weakly increasing over some interval until it reaches 1. F ( ) can only ever be 1 if e= p = s b , while to derive this function we assumed p 0 such that e= p = s b implies e < 0. Since any player can simply guarantee himself a zero skewing pro…t by not skewing, playing a strategy with negative expected value is strictly dominated by not skewing.
The same reasoning used to exclude mixed equilibria with …xed and known amounts of skewness can be used to exclude mass-points in the distribution everywhere except on the lower bound. However, if a distribution has a mass-point only on the lower bound it is still continuous and weakly increasing over the interval. Under the assumption e > 0 and p > 0 the …rst derivative of the CDF is negative, which is also not possible, so we can exclude these equilibria as well.
Since this is all known ex-ante, so long as s b ; s a 6 = 0 the unique equilibrium of this game is one where no player skews.
Conclusions and concluding remarks
Although bid skewing is a common problem in unit price auctions, solutions do exist. In this paper I showed two relatively easy adjustments to the unit price auction that could decrease if not eliminate bid skewing altogether. Even though the …rst solution, obscuring the score rule, might not be legally allowed for governmental agencies (within the EU at least), they to have a readily available solution in the split award procedure in a framework contract. The non-governmental parties using a reverse auction are o¤ course not bound by the transparency requirements.
If the split award procedure is chosen, the way the contract is split has profound in ‡uence on the way bidders should behave. The exact e¤ects are not analyzed in this paper, but a related subject is already analyzed in Alcalde & Dahm (2009) . They show that strategically choosing the contracts sizes might be used to mitigate the loss in e¢ ciency caused by selecting more than only the most e¢ cient bidder.
A problem I have ignored in this paper sofar is collusion. In splitting the contract, the procedure can become very sensitive to collusion, see for instance Anton & Yao (1989) . The procedure I propose is more robust then the one described there, because the decision to split is taken exogenously. This makes it impossible for bidders to select price-quantity combinations. In Anton & Yao (1989) it is this ability, just as in second degree price discrimination, that helps bidders coordinate. Having said that, the possibilities of a bid ring to dissipate pro…ts increases if more winners are selected, making bidding rings easier to set up. On the other hand, if the ring skews, this makes it pro…table for any bidder to break the ring by skewing slightly less, which automatically gives the tenderer the possibility to punish the skewing preferred supplier. How this plays out in theory or in practice remains for further research. such that (b) = v, the expected pro…t of an o¤er b i is :
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:: given symmetry of bidders and strategies: b i = (v i ), so (b) = v and recalling that F ( ) is the CDF of v:
where C is the binomial coe¢ cient.
Then, adapted from Menezes & Monteiro (1998), de…ne:
Lemma 1 for any integer P; 1 P < N; and 2 R p+1 ; a p+1 = 0
proof see below. Then the pro…t function can be written as:
The FOC becomes:
Since I assume the bidding-function to be twice di¤erentiable and symmetric across bid-
; b by (v i ) and (b) by v i , then rewriting yields:
0 ,integrating both sides and setting (0) = 0 yields:
or alternatively, trough integration by parts:
Which is monotonically increasing in v if p p+1 0 (see below) which holds trivially if the contracts are ordered in size.
Allowing for risk aversion the problem has to be slightly restated. Given symmetry amongst bidders, (v) = b, and (b) = v being used by other players as well so Assume all bidders have the same utility function u [ ], their problem becomes:
n p 9 addapted from Menezes & Monteiro(1998) Then de…ne:
such that:
) Then the FOC becomes:
Since I assume the bidding-function to be twice di¤erentiable, I can replace 0 (v i ) by
Then rewriting and integrating, while setting (0) = 0 yields
7.3 Proof of monotonicity of bid functions under risk neutrality
n p ] di¤erentiating according to the rules for fractions and simplifying:
0 (v i ) = 1 (1
(a p a p+1 ) (n p)C Where the last inequality holds, because it is the integral of a strictly positive function times a sum of positive terms as long as a p a p+1 0; divided by a square. So for any series for which a p a p+1 0 holds the function is increasing in v or in terms of the contracts, the contracts are ordered in terms of size, which can be assumed without loss of generality.
monotonicity of the bid functions under risk aversion
Recall that the bidfunction can be expressed as:
To check that this is indeed an increasing function of v i , as assumed, I follow the Monotone Comparative Statics approach from Milgrom & Shannon (1994) and Milgrom & Roberts, (1994) . Returning to the goal function to check for the required single crossing property, we see that in optimum:
Since the second derivative of the utility function is negative, the …rst summation is positive as long as the bid function is increasing (as assumed). As in lemma 3 we know 
